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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Mr. Yearsley appeals from the district court’s Judgment of Conviction and Order of
Retained Jurisdiction.

On appeal, he asserts that the district court erred in admitting

impermissible I.R.E. 404(b) evidence of unrelated conduct that occurred prior to and following
the incident at a Maverick as the probative value of this evidence was substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
On September 20, 2017, an Information was filed charging Mr. Yearsley with aggravated
assault, use of a firearm or deadly weapon during the commission of a crime, and petit theft.
(R., pp.33-34, 86-87.) The charges were the result of a report to police that an individual had
stolen wine from a Maverick convenience store, threatened an individual who followed him out,
and eventually fired a gun while leaving the parking lot in his vehicle. (PSI, p.3.)1 Mr. Yearsley
entered a not guilty plea to the charges. (R., p.35.)
The State filed a Notice of Intent to Use I.R.E. 404(b) Evidence. (R., p.67.) Specifically,
the State sought to introduce evidence of Mr. Yearsley’s alleged conduct near the time of the
charged criminal conduct, including a hit-and-run accident at a nearby Walmart and a report that
Mr. Yearsley had shown a gun to an employee at a Chevron station in Horseshoe Bend while
stating that he could, but was not going to, rob the store.2 (R., pp.69-70.) Mr. Yearsley filed an
Objection to State’s Notice of Intent to Use I.R.E. 404(b), noting that the evidence was not

1

For ease of reference, the electronic file containing the Presentence Investigation Report and
attachments will be cited as “PSI” and referenced pages will correspond with the electronic page
numbers contained in this file.
1

relevant and was overly prejudicial. (R., p.75.) Following a hearing, the district court allowed
the State to present evidence of Mr. Yearsley’s conduct during the evening in question, both
prior to and following the incident at the Maverick store. (Tr., p.12, Ls.7-20.)
The case proceeded to trial. (R., pp.93-99.)
The State presented that testimony of Arturo Juarez, a Walmart employee working in loss
prevention (Tr., p.118, L.2 – p.132, L.10); Faolin Gill, the cashier at the Maverick store
(Tr., p.135, L.4– p.160, L.20); Jacob Harper, an employee of the Valley View Chevron in
Horseshoe Bend (Tr., p.171, L.11 - p.181, L.14); Corporal Mike Baker, the officer that
responded to the call from Mr. Harper in Horseshoe Bend (Tr., p.187, L.13 - p.195, L.11);
Issiaka Bitibale, a delivery driver working at the Maverick store and who witnessed Mr. Yearsley
firing a gun (Tr., p.227, L.16 – p.249, L.18); Shannon Virag, another delivery driver working at
the Maverick that evening (Tr., p.263, L.3 - p.268, L.9); and Detective Jamie Dozier, the officer
that responded to the Maverick store and investigated the case (Tr., p.270, L10 - p.287, L.4).
The defense presented only one witness, Mr. Yearsley, who admitted stealing wine and
cigarettes and to firing a gun in the air like a cowboy, but denied threatening anyone. (Tr., p.299,
L.18 - p.310, L.25.)
Ultimately, the jury found Mr. Yearsley guilty of each of the three charges. (R., pp.132134.) He was sentenced to a retained jurisdiction and unified sentence of twelve years, with two
years fixed, for aggravated assault and a firearm enhancement, and thirty days for the petit theft

2

The State also sought to introduce an unrelated incident from a few months prior. (R., pp.7071.) However, this evidence was properly excluded by the district court. (Tr., p.11, Ls.22-24.)
2

conviction. 3 (R., pp.143-146.) Mr. Yearsley filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the Judgment
of Conviction and Order of Retained Jurisdiction. (R., pp.143-146.)

3

As of the filing of this Appellant’s Brief, Mr. Yearsley is still serving his period of retained
jurisdiction.
3

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion by admitting I.R.E. 404(b) evidence that was unfairly
prejudicial?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Admitting I.R.E. 404(b) Evidence That Was
Unfairly Prejudicial

A.

Introduction
The State presented testimony and exhibits showing that, prior to arriving at Maverick

where the charged criminal conduct occurred, Mr. Yearsley had attempted to enter a Walmart
that was closed and drove over a fence, causing damage to his vehicle, and, over an hour after
the Maverick incident, showed a gun to a convenience store employee in a nearby town.
Mr. Yearsley asserts that the district court erred in admitting this evidence as it was
impermissible Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b) evidence. He asserts that the related exhibits and
testimony of Mr. Juarez, Mr. Harper, Corporal Baker, and Detective Dozier, who each testified
about the unrelated events that occurred prior to and following the charged conduct, have
minimal probative value and that the limited value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice.

B.

Applicable Jurisprudence
Idaho appellate Courts apply an abuse of discretion standard when reviewing a lower

court’s decision to either admit or exclude evidence. White v. Mock, 140 Idaho 882, 888 (2004).
Under I.R.E. 404(b), evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to show a
defendant's criminal propensity.

State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 667 (2010).

“It may,

however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident,” if the prosecution has
provided notice that it intends to produce the evidence. Id.; I.R.E. 404(b). Yet, under I.R.E. 403,
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relevant evidence may be excluded “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice.” State v. Page, 135 Idaho 214, 219 (2000).
In determining whether I.R.E. 404(b) evidence was properly admitted, the appellate court
employs a two-step analysis, determining: (1) whether, under I.R.E. 404(b), the evidence is
relevant as a matter of law to an issue other than the defendant's character or criminal propensity;
and (2) whether, under I.R.E. 403, the district court abused its discretion in finding the probative
value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the
defendant. Johnson, 148 Idaho at 667 (citing State v. Cross, 132 Idaho 667, 670 (1999)).
However, “evidence of a person’s actions or conduct, other than that set forth as an ultimate
issue for trial, is generally inadmissible under I.R.E. 404(b).” State v. Medrano, 123 Idaho 114,
119 (Ct. App. 1992) (quoting State v. Rodriguez, 118 Idaho 948, 950 (Ct. App. 1990).
Determinations of relevancy involve an issue of law and are reviewed de novo.

State v.

Hairston, 133 Idaho 496, 501 (1999); State v. Parmer, 147 Idaho 210, 218 (Ct. App. 2009).
When reviewing the determination that the probative value of the evidence is not outweighed by
unfair prejudice, the abuse of discretion standard is applied. State v. Atkinson, 124 Idaho 816
(Ct. App. 1993).
Appellate courts use a three-part test for determining whether a district court abused its
discretion: (1) whether the court correctly perceived that the issue was one of discretion; (2)
whether the court acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the
legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) whether it reached its
decision by an exercise of reason. State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 143 (2008) (citing Sun Valley
Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94 (1991)).
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C.

Relevant Factual Information
Prior to trial, the State filed a Notice of Intent to Use I.R.E. 404(b) Evidence. (R., p.67.)

The State sought to introduce evidence of Mr. Yearsley’s alleged conduct near the time of the
charged criminal conduct, including a hit-and-run accident at a nearby Walmart and a report that
Mr. Yearsley had shown a gun to an employee at a Chevron station in Horseshoe Bend while
stating that he could, but was not going to, rob the store. (R., pp.69-70.) Although the original
Notice sought introduction of the evidence for any of the I.R.E. 404(b) purposes, the State’s
Brief in Support of Notice of Intent to Use I.R.E. 404(b) Evidence agued only that the evidence
was relevant to prove identity and, possibly, that Mr. Yearsley’s alleged actions were not the
result of a mistake or accident. (R., pp.67, 71-72.) Mr. Yearsley filed an Objection to State’s
Notice of Intent to Use I.R.E. 404(b), noting that the evidence was not relevant and was overly
prejudicial. (R., p.75.)
At the hearing, Mr. Yearsley argued that the prior bad act evidence should not be
admitted as the identity exception was an insufficient reason to justify admitting the evidence
because identity would not be an issue in the trial. (Tr., p.7, L.22 – p.8, L.8.) He noted that there
was surveillance video from the Maverick store and photos showing that Mr. Yearsley was
arrested in the same clothing as depicted in the video. (Tr., p.8, Ls.4-8.) Further, counsel
offered to stipulate to identity. (Tr., p.8, Ls.2-3.) Counsel concluded, because there was other
evidence proving identity, the evidence had limited probative value and allowing the State to
present the evidence would result in unfair prejudice. (Tr., p.8, Ls.9-16.)
The State argued that identity could not be proven absent evidence from the other acts,
the jury needed to be provided information about how the police determined Mr. Yearsley was
the person that committed the events at the Maverick, and that, even with a stipulation, the State
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still had the burden of proving identity. (Tr., p.9, Ls.1-24.) The State also argued that the
evidence was relevant for the purposes of proving intent. (Tr., p.10, Ls.1-25.) Specifically, that
Mr. Yearsley’s actions at Walmart showed his intent to steal and his actions at the Chevron store
showed his intent to use his “weapon in a threatening manner.” (Tr., p.10, Ls.5-25.) The State
also noted that the evidence could potentially be relevant for other purposes “depending on the
trial testimony.” (Tr., p.11, Ls.2-6.)
The district court allowed the State to present evidence of Mr. Yearsley’s conduct during
the evening in question, both prior to and following the incident at the Maverick store “as it is
part of the same context of the same incident” and for identity purposes because “[t]he State still
has the obligation to prove identity beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Tr., p.12, Ls.7-20.) The
district court did not address whether the evidence’s probative value was outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice. (Tr., p.11, L.21 – p.12, L.20.)
The case proceeded to trial. (R., pp.93-99.)
The State’s first witness was Arturo Juarez, a Walmart employee working in loss
prevention.

(Tr., p.118, Ls.2-12.)

Mr. Juarez testified that when he arrived at work on

August 14, 2017, he noticed that some of Walmart’s fencing had been torn down and was told
that a vehicle had run though the fencing. (Tr., p.120, Ls.4-10.) He began looking for video
surveillance of the incident. (Tr., p.120, Ls.21-25.) He was able to locate surveillance and that
surveillance was admitted as State’s Exhibit 1. (Tr., p.121, L.23 – p.123, L.13.) Mr. Juarez
offered a very detailed explanation of the video as it was played to the jury. (Tr., p.125, L.7 –
p.131, L.8.) He also summarized the video for jury noting that it showed a vehicle arrived, a
man (later shown to be Mr. Yearsley) exit his vehicle, attempt to enter the store at the north
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entrance, then attempt to enter through the south entrance, return to his vehicle, and drive over
fencing as he left the location. (Tr., p.131, L.24 – p.132, L.10; State’s Ex. 1.)
The State then presented the testimony of Faolin Gill, the cashier at the Maverick store.
(Tr., p.135, L.4 – p.136, L.22.) After identifying Mr. Yearsley in court and through a photograph
(State’s Exhibit 5), Ms. Gill testified that Mr. Yearsley entered the store, asked about the location
of wine, was told that it was too late to purchase wine, returned to the cash register with wine,
asked for cigarettes to purchase, and left the store without paying for the items. (Tr., p.137, L.10
– p.148, L.19; State’s Ex. 5.) Shortly thereafter, one of the delivery drivers, Mr. Bitibale,
followed Mr. Yearsley out of the store, returned a couple of minutes later, and told Ms. Gill that
he had been shot at. (Tr., p.149, L.22 – p.155, L.8.) Ms. Gill also provided the foundation for
the admittance of two separate exhibits depicting the events in question. (Tr., p.155, L.9 – p.156,
L.21, p.14, L.18 – p.160, L.20; See State’s Exs. 2 & 3.)
Next, Jacob Harper, an employee of the Valley View Chevron in Horseshoe Bend,
testified that he had an unusual interaction with a customer. (Tr., p.171, L.11 – p.172, L.14.)
Mr. Harper stated that in early morning hours, a man pulled up to the gas station, tried to buy
wine, but was denied, purchased gas, chatted with Mr. Harper, showed off his gun, and then said
“I should rob you, but I’m not going to.” (Tr., p.175, L.6 – p.179, L.13.) He also testified that
the man was drinking, poured himself a glass of wine while he was pumping his gas, was “pretty
intoxicated,” ran over the dividers in the middle of the road, and was staggering. (Tr., p.176,
Ls.13-25, p.181, Ls.9-14.) Mr. Harper identified Mr. Yearsley from a photo later that same day
and also identified him in court. (Tr., p.172, L.15 – p.173, L.17, p.180, Ls.16-25.)
Corporal Mike Baker testified that was the officer that responded to the call from
Mr. Harper at the Chevron. (Tr., p.187, L.13 - p.189, L.25.) After Mr. Harper identified
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Mr. Yearsley from a photo, Corporal Baker contacted Mr. Yearsley, arrested him, and took
possession of a revolver from Mr. Yearsley’s wife. (Tr., p.192, L.2 – p.195, L.11.)
Issiaka Bitibale testified that he was working on the night in question and observed a man
take items from a Maverick store. (Tr., p.227, L.16 – p.230, L.24, p.238, L.2 – p.240, L.6.) He
followed this man out the door, the man told him “don’t follow me” and displayed a gun.
(Tr., p.240, L.7 – p.242, L.4.) The man then entered his vehicle, drove away, and fired his gun
as he left the area. (Tr., p.245, L.3 – p.249, L.18.) Mr. Bitibale identified Mr. Yearsley in court
as the man he observed that evening. (Tr., p.238, Ls.11-20.)
The State then presented the testimony of Shannon Virag, another delivery driver
working at the Maverick that evening. (Tr., p.263, L.3 – p.264, L.2.) He observed Mr. Bitibale
follow Mr. Yearsley out of the store and heard him ask, “What’s going on here?” (Tr., p.267,
L.7 – p.268, L.9.) During his testimony, Mr. Virag identified Mr. Yearsley as the individual he
saw at the Maverick. (Tr., p.264, Ls.3-9.)
The State’s last witness was Detective Jamie Dozier. (Tr., p.270, Ls.10-24.) Detective
Dozier responded to the Maverick store and investigated the case, including looking at the
incident at Walmart and in Horseshoe Bend. (Tr., p.271, L.18 – p.275, L.23.) Detective Dozier
took a photo of Mr. Yearsley when he made contact with him, around 10:00 a.m. (Tr., p.276,
Ls.7-22; State’s Ex. 15.) He compared the video surveillance from Maverick and Walmart and
was able to determine that the individual in the surveillance video was the same person he was in
contact with by comparing the facial hair, facial features, clothing, and shoes. (Tr., p.272, L.1 –
p.278, L.2.) He also testified about damage to Mr. Yearsley’s vehicle and that such damage was
significant because the vehicle did not appear to have been damaged when it entered the
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Walmart parking lot and the damage was consistent with driving over a fence as was show in the
surveillance video. (Tr., p.285, L.1 – p.287, L.4; State’s Exs.11-14.)
The State rested. (Tr., p.299, Ls.14-15.)
The defense presented only one witness, Mr. Yearsley. (Tr., p.299, Ls.18-22.) He
admitted that he had gone to the Maverick store, stole wine and cigarettes after learning that the
cashier would not sell him any wine, that he left the store quickly, told Mr. Bitibale not to follow
him, drove away, and shot his gun up in the air like a “cowboy leaving town.” (Tr., p.300. L.22
– p.306, L.25.)

However, he denied that he showed the gun to Mr. Bitibale, threatened

Mr. Bitibale, or fired the gun in an attempt to threaten or frighten anyone or towards any person.
(Tr., p.304, Ls.23-25, p.310, Ls.2-25.)
Following the close of evidence, the court provided a limiting instruction regarding the
I.R.E. 404(b) evidence:
Evidence has been introduced for the purpose of showing that the
defendant committed acts other than that for which the defendant is on trial.
Such evidence, if believed, is not to be considered by you to prove the
defendant’s character or that the defendant has a disposition to commit crimes.
Such evidence may be considered by you only for the limited purpose of
proving the defendant’s motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
(R., p.126; Tr., p.319, L.20 – p.320, L.5.)

D.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Admitting Rule 404(b) Evidence That Was
Unfairly Prejudicial
1.

Relevancy

Evidence is only relevant if the jury can reasonably conclude that the act occurred and
that the defendant was the actor. State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 52 (2009) (citation omitted.). In
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order to make this determination, “the trial court must determine whether there is sufficient
evidence to establish the other crime or wrong as fact.” Id. (citations omitted.) “The trial court
must then determine whether the other crime or wrong is relevant to a material and disputed
issue concerning the crime charged, other than propensity.” Id. (citations omitted.)

a.

Offer Of Proof

Although the district court failed to articulate a determination of whether there was
sufficient evidence to determine if the prior bad acts were fact, Mr. Yearsley does not challenge
admissibility under this prong.

b.

Relevance For A Non-Propensity Purpose

“Evidence of uncharged misconduct may not be admitted pursuant to I.R.E. 404(b) when
its probative value is entirely dependent upon its tendency to demonstrate the defendant’s
propensity to engage in such behavior.” Grist, 147 Idaho at 52. Evidence of uncharged bad acts
is admissible if relevant to a material issue such as motive, intent, mistake or accident, common
scheme or plan, and identity. State v. Lawrence, 112 Idaho 149, 155 (Ct. App. 1986); See also
I.R.E. 404(b).
The district court specifically found that the evidence was relevant under I.R.E. 404(b)
“as it is part of the same context of the same incident” and for identity purposes because “[t]he
State still has the obligation to prove identity beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Tr., p.12, Ls.7-20.)
Mr. Yearsley asserts that the evidence was not admissible as “context” of the incident as res
gestae is not a ground for admitting I.R.E. 404(b) evidence. See I.R.E. 404(b); State v. Kralovec,
161 Idaho 569, 574 (2017). However, Mr. Yearsley does not challenge the relevancy of the
evidence for the purpose of identity.
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Although intent was not a reason that the district court allowed the State to present the
evidence, and Mr. Yearsley was not afforded an opportunity to respond to the intent argument,
the State also asserted that I.R.E. 404(b) evidence was admissible to show intent.4 (Tr., p.10,
Ls.1-25.)

Mr. Yearsley asserts that the evidence was not admissible for this purpose.5

Attempting to enter a Walmart by trying to open the public doors is not evidence of intent to
steal. (See State’s Ex.1.) Further, showing a cashier a weapon, during a conversation and after
making a purchase, but specifically denying any intention of committing a robbery and then not
committing a robbery does not show intent to “use a weapon in a threatening manner.”
(Tr., p.10, Ls.23-24, p.175, L.6 – p.179, L.13.) Although this behavior was odd, it was not
criminal and does not prove an earlier criminal intent.

2.

The Court Abused Its Discretion Because The Evidence Was More Prejudicial
Than Probative

In the case at hand, defense counsel addressed the overly prejudicial nature of the
proposed I.R.E. 404(b) evidence. (R., p.75; Tr., p.8, Ls.9-16.) However, the district court did
not address the prejudicial effect of admitting the I.R.E. 404(b) evidence. (Tr., p.11, L.21 – p.12,
L.20.)
“[T]he Rules of Evidence generally govern the admission of all evidence in the courts of
this State.” State v. Ruiz, 150 Idaho 469, 471 (2010), (quoting State v. Meister, 148 Idaho 236,

4

Although Mr. Yearsley offers specific argument regarding identity and intent, he asserts that
the I.R.E. 404(b) evidence was inadmissible for all I.R.E. 404(b) purposes other than identity.
5
Mr. Yearsley presents argument regarding intent in an abundance of caution, recognizing that
the State, on appeal, may rely on intent as an alternative ground for admissibility. He
acknowledges that his specific arguments regarding intent were not made below. However, he
argued that the evidence was not relevant in his Objection to State’s Notice of Intent to Use
I.R.E. 404(b) and, as such, he maintains that he has preserved the issue of relevance for all I.R.E.
404(b) purposes. (R., p.75.)
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240 (2009) (emphasis in original)). To exclude evidence under I.R.E. 403, the trial court must
address whether the probative value is substantially outweighed by one of the considerations
listed in the Rule. Ruiz, 150 Idaho at 471 (quoting Meister, 148 Idaho at 241).
The district court clearly abused its discretion when it failed to address whether the
probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by the prejudicial effect. As such,
the district court did not act consistently with the applicable legal standards. Mr. Yearsley
asserts that on this basis alone, his case must be remanded for a new trial.
Alternatively, he asserts that the I.R.E. 404(b) evidence was unfairly prejudicial and that
the evidence should have been excluded under I.R.E. 403. Under I.R.E. 403, relevant evidence
can be excluded by the district court if, inter alia, the probative value of that evidence is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, danger of
misleading the jury, or if the evidence would involve needless presentation of cumulative
evidence. State v. Tapia, 127 Idaho 249, 254 (1995). To some extent all probative evidence is
prejudicial. State v. Gauna, 117 Idaho 83, 88 (Ct. App. 1989). The question is whether that
prejudice is unfair; whether it harms the defendant because it is so inflammatory that it would
lead the jury to convict regardless of other facts presented. Id.
While the district court’s calculus of whether the probative value of evidence is
substantially outweighed by its prejudice is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, this discretion is
not without limits. As noted by the court in Stoddard:
This is not a discretion to depart from the principle that evidence of other crimes,
having no substantial relevancy except to ground the inference that [the] accused
is a bad man and hence probably committed the crime, must be excluded. The
leeway of discretion lies rather in the opposite direction, empowering the judge to
exclude other-crimes evidence, even when it has substantial independent
relevancy, if in his judgment its probative value for this purpose is outweighed by
the danger that it will stir such passion in the jury as to sweep them beyond a
rational consideration of guilt or innocence of the crime on trial. Discretion
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implies not only leeway but responsibility. A decision clearly wrong on this
question of balancing probative value against danger of prejudice will be
corrected on appeal as an abuse of discretion.
State v. Stoddard, 105 Idaho 533, 537 (Ct. App. 1983), (quoting MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK
THE

OF

LAW ON EVIDENCE § 190 (Cleary ed. 1972). Additionally, as with all matters of discretion

on the part of the district court, the court’s determination of whether the probative value of the
evidence is outweighed by its potential prejudice must comport with applicable legal standards.
See, e.g., Straub v. Smith, 145 Idaho 65, 70 (2007) (finding an abuse of discretion when the
district court’s action was not consistent with applicable legal standards).
Evidence of misconduct not charged in an underlying offense may have an unjust
influence on the jurors and may lead them to determine guilt based upon either:

(1) a

presumption that if the defendant did it before, he must have done it this time; or (2) an opinion
that it does not really matter whether the defendant committed the charged crime because he
deserves to be punished anyhow for other bad acts. State v. Wood, 126 Idaho 241, 244-45
(Ct. App. 1994). “The prejudicial effect of [character evidence] is that it induces the jury to
believe the accused is more likely to have committed the crime on trial because he is a man of
criminal character.” Grist, 147 Idaho at 52 (quoting State v. Wrenn, 99 Idaho 506, 510 (1978)).
Therefore, I.R.E. 404 precludes the use of character evidence or other misconduct evidence to
imply that the defendant must have acted consistently with those past acts or traits. Id.
In the case at hand, the I.R.E. 404(b) evidence had limited, if any, probative value and
such value was substantially outweighed by its danger of unfair prejudice. The district court
abused its discretion in allowing the presentation of this unfairly prejudicial and unnecessarily
cumulative evidence when it failed to reach its decision through an exercise of reason.
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Although Mr. Yearsley is not challenging whether the I.R.E. 404(b) evidence is relevant
on appeal for proving identity, he asserts that the probative value of the evidence is very low.
The State had ample other evidence to prove Mr. Yearsley’s identity. All three individuals who
witnessed the events at Maverick identified Mr. Yearsley in court.

(Tr., p.137, Ls.14-20

(Ms. Gill), p.238, Ls.11-20 (Mr. Bitibale), p.264, Ls.3-9 (Mr. Virag).)

The State had

surveillance video from Maverick depicting Mr. Yearsley and his actions inside the store.
(State’s Exs. 2 and 3.) Additionally, the State had a photograph taken when Mr. Yearsley was
arrested hours later. (State’s Ex. 15.) The jury would have been able to look at the clothing,
body build, and facial hair of Mr. Yearsley and compare the photo taken after arrest with the
surveillance video. After all, Detective Dozier determined, when he contacted Mr. Yearsley, that
he was the same individual as shown in the surveillance videos was by making the same
comparison. (Tr., p.277, L.10 – p.278, L.2.) This evidence was more than sufficient to establish
Mr. Yearsley’s identity; especially in light of the fact that Mr. Yearsley took the stand and
admitted that he had gone to the Maverick on the night in question and stole items while he was
there. (Tr., p.307, L.23 – p.308, L.2.)
Testimony and exhibits showing that Mr. Yearsley had gone other places, before and
after the incident at Maverick, does very little, if anything, to help identify him. Other than
having an additional video showing Mr. Yearsley in the same clothing, near the time of the
incident, the additional Walmart surveillance was not helpful to the jury in determining if
Mr. Yearsley was the person involved with the events at Maverick. Certainly, if that the purpose
of introducing the surveillance, it could have been limited to showing Mr. Yearsley approach the
locked doors and walk away.

Regardless, such evidence was merely cumulative and

unnecessary.
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Further, the State had no duty to prove the steps taken by the police to determine
Mr. Yearsley’s identity or to prove what vehicle Mr. Yearsley was driving. Therefore, evidence
showing Mr. Yearsley’s actions at Walmart, involving his arrival and departure, including
running over a fence, were of very little probative value and far less beneficial to the jury for
purposes of determining identity than the eyewitness identifications and a photo comparison to
the Maverick surveillance.
Finally, evidence that Mr. Yearsley had gone to another convenience store later in the
evening, where he was again identified as an individual driving a white suburban and possessing
a gun, does very little to assist the jury in identifying Mr. Yearsley as the person involved with
the events at the Maverick earlier in the night.
The I.R.E. 404(b) evidence was cumulative, unnecessary, and provided little assistance to
the jury; and, as such, was of very limited probative value.
In contrast, the danger of unfair prejudice was very high. The evidence portrayed
Mr. Yearsley as reckless driver who damaged property without a care, a person who drove while
under the influence, kept open containers in his vehicle, and was infatuated with his handgun; a
man of criminal character. While none of these representation assisted the jury in determining
Mr. Yearsley’s identity, they certainly acted to inflame the jury.
The State also argued that the I.R.E. 404(b) evidence was admissible to prove intent.
(Tr., p.10, Ls.1-25.)

Mr. Yearsley asserts that the evidence was not admissible for these

purposes. See section D(1)(b) supra. Assuming arguendo that the evidence was relevant for
proving intent, Mr. Yearsley maintains that the evidence was unfairly prejudicial. Notably, the
evidence was not limited to only that evidence which may have shown intent (i.e. attempting to
enter Walmart and displaying a gun while at the Chevron). Therefore, even if the evidence is

17

found to have been admissible for these purposes, it does not alleviate the prejudice from the
evidence showing that Mr. Yearsley drove over a fence, damaged his vehicle and private
property, and drove away from the accident or, that later in the evening, he was drinking while
he gassed up his vehicle, was staggering, and driving over dividers in the road. This evidence
was not admissible to show intent and was unfairly prejudicial as it portrayed Mr. Yearsley as a
man of criminal character.
Furthermore, credibility was at the heart of the case. Mr. Yearsley admitted to stealing
items from the Maverick and to firing a gun while driving away. (Tr., p.300. L.22 – p.306,
L.25.) However, he denied that he showed the gun to Mr. Bitibale, threatened Mr. Bitibale, or
fired the gun in an attempt to threaten or frighten anyone or towards any person. (Tr., p.304,
Ls.23-25, p.310, Ls.2-25.) Therefore, the jury could not rely on Mr. Yearsley’s admissions in
determining guilt or innocence for the aggravated assault charge. Mr. Yearsley’s actions outside
of the Maverick, where the alleged assault occurred, were not caught on surveillance. As a
result, it was squarely left to the jury to determine what really occurred, by deciding who to
believe. In a case where credibility is a central issue, the prior bad act evidence could easily
interfere with the jury’s ability to make an impartial decision.
Where a significant portion of the trial focused on the prior bad acts of Mr. Yearsley, the
prejudicial nature of the evidence outweighed its probative value.

Simply, the jury was

overwhelmed with evidence of uncharged conduct; undoubtedly, it considered Mr. Yearsley to
be a man of criminal character. In this case, where the danger of unfair prejudice was very high
and the jury heard witness after witness describe uncharged conduct, the district court abused its
discretion by failing to exclude the evidence pursuant to I.R.E. 403.
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E.

The State Will Be Unable To Prove That Admitting The Evidence Was Harmless Error
The harmless error doctrine has been defined by this Court:

“To hold an error as

harmless, an appellate court must declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that there was no
reasonable possibility that such evidence complained of contributed to the conviction.” State v.
Sharp, 101 Idaho 498, 507 (1980) (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)).
Where alleged error is followed by a contemporaneous objection and the appellant shows that a
violation occurred, the State bears the burden of proving the error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt, based upon the test articulated by the United States Supreme Court in
Chapman. See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227 (2010).
In this instance, because the error was objected to, it is the State’s burden to prove that
the admittance of the evidence did not contribute to the conviction. Mr. Yearsley maintains that
the error was not harmless because the prejudicial effect of the jury improperly hearing the I.R.E.
404(b) evidence may have influenced the jury’s ability to be impartial despite jury instructions
attempting to limit the purpose for which the jury considered the evidence.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Yearsley respectfully requests that his judgments of conviction be vacated and his
case remanded for further proceedings.
DATED this 9th day of November, 2018.

/s/ Elizabeth Ann Allred
ELIZABETH ANN ALLRED
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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